Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1951

Winslow C. Cole v. Marguerite D. Cole : Brief of
the Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
King & Anderson; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Cole v. Cole, No. 7717 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1558

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

771~.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

\\'lNSLO\V C. CC)LE.
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.

\'s.

i' L\RGUERITE

7717

J). COLE.

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

KING c~ ANDERSON.

FILED
'"'''· 1 1951
1\U\.)0V

----------------·-;;~;_h---·

------------e Court, "'
~ . Clerk, Supretn

Attorneys /or Defendant
and Appellant
1012 Boston Building

Salt Lake

City,

Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................,

3

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON IN THIS APPEAL

7

ARGUMENT............................................................................................

8

POINT NO. I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL DECREE FINALLY ADJUDICATED THE RIGHT OF THE DEFEN'DANT TO
ALIMONY. THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE
DECREE RESERVED JURISDICTION FOR A SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATION OF ALIMONY ......................

8

POINT NO. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT \\THETHER AN AWARD OF ALIMONY WOULD
SEEM JUST AND EQUITABLE TO THE PRESENT
DEPENDENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WAS A LEGAL
GROUND TO BE CONSIDERED IN MAKING AN
AWARD ............................................................................................. , 14
POINT .NO. III. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
COURT SHOW THAT A SU.BST ANTIAL CHANGE IN
THE MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANT HAD TAKEN PLACE
JUSTIFYING AN AWARD OF ALIMONY AS PRAYED,
AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT THAT THE
EVIDENCE DID NOT JUSTIFY AN ORDER FOR ALIMONY WAS CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED
FACTS AND TO THE COURT'S OWN FINDINGS........

15

CONCLUSION ···-···················································································

17

INDEX OF CASES CITED
Alldridge v. Alld'ridge,- Utah-; 229 P. 2d. 681.. ..,. ........ .,..........

9

Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196; 111 P. 2d 792..........

12

Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456; 154 P. 952 ...................... ·-·····················

11

Curtis v. Bachman, 110 Calif. 433; 42 P. 9'10....................................

11

Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200; 158 P. 781.. .......................................... 8, 9
Ex Parte Glines, 20 Okla. 446; 94 P. 668....................................

11

FedeTal Signs System v. Amavet, 7 La. App. 680..........................

11

Hokum v. Chic. R. I. & P. Railway Co., 27 Okla. 667; 112 P.
1023 ......................................................................................................

11

Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176; 52 N. E. 2nd. 27....

11

People v. Priest, 181 N. Y. 300; 73 N. E. 1100.............................. 11
Shuster v .. Schuster, 88 Utah 257; 53 P. 2d. 428 ....... -...................

8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Swallow v. Swallow, 84 N. J. Equity 109; 92 Atl. 872.......... 11
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Am. Juris., Vol. 17, p. 478................ -------·----------·----····--------·····----:--...... 15
30 A. L. R. 79 ...............................•... ,...................................................... 15
64 A. L. R. 1269 ....................................................................................... 15
112 A. L. R. 246........................................................................................ 15
INDEX OF STATUTES CITED
40-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943................................. ,................ 14, 16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Suprellle Court
of the State of Utah

\\'11'\SLO\\' C. COLE.
Plaintiff and Responclcnt,
Case No.
7717

Vs.

0TARGUERITE D. COLE.
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
\Vinslow C. Cole, the respondent in the above-entitled
matter, secured a decree of divorce from his wife. the appellant, in the District Court for Millard County, State of Utah,
on the 19th day of May, 1936. In that action the defendant's counterclaim for divorce was denied and the divorce
granted to the plaintiff on the ground of desertion.
3
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With respect to the property of the parties, the court, in
paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of its Findings of Fact, found that
each of the parties was entitled to one-half of the value of
the community property and that one-half of said amount
would be due the defendant. In addition to this specific finding with respect to community property, paragraph 10 of the
Findings provided:
"1 0. That the defendant is entitled to alimony
or support money in the sum of $60.00 per month
for a period of one year from date, and $30.00 per
month thereafter for one year, or until the further order
of this court." (See page 4 of the T r.)

The Conclusions of Law which the court reached provided that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant the sum
of $1,037.50 as her share of the community property, plus
the further sum of $1.323.00 which represented the amount
the plaintiff had borrowed from the defendant. In addition
to the specific provisions with respect to the division of the
property of the parties, the Conclusions of Law provided as
follows:
"That the plaintiff should pay to the deFendant
as alimony for her support and maintenance, the sum
of $60.00 per month for a period of one year. commencing on June 1. 1936; and after the expiration of'
one year, that is after June 1, 1937, the further sum
of $30.00 per month for one year, or until June 1,
1938, or until the further order of this court." (See
page 5 of the transcript.)
The Decree of divorce based upon the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law made the following provisions with rrspect to the division of the property of the parties and the obligation for payment of alimony and support money:

,j
·j

"It is further ordered. adjudged. and df'cr<:>ed thnt
4
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the plaintiff pay to the defendant the sum of
S 1037.50, being one-half of the value of the community property, and the further sum of $ 1323.00, the
unpaid amount of the principal and the accrued interest
on the same owing by the plaintiff to the defendant,
and that upon pa~ment by the plaintiff to the defend~
ant of the aggregate amount of said sums, to-wit: a
total of $2360.50, the title to all of the community
property shall ipso facto vest in the plaintiff, and it'
the record title to the same or any part thereof is not
in the plaintiff. this court will enter a decree vesting
in the plaintiff the record title, as well as the equitable
title, to all community property.
"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that
the plaintiff pay to the clerk of this court for the use
and benefit of the defendant as alimony and for her
support and maintenance the sum of $60.00 per month
for a period of one year commencing on June 1, 1936;
or a total of $720.00; and after the expiration of one
year, that is, commencing June 1, 1937; the sum of
$30.00 per month for one year, or until June 1, 1938;
or a total of $360.00; unless the court otherwise order
and direct; and aU sums so naid to the clerk by the
plaintiff for the use of the defendant shall be by sairl
clerk transmitted and forwarded to her without delay."
(See page 2 of the Tr.)
The above provisions are cited for the court's convenience,
and to point out that specific provision was made with respect
to the property of the parties that in no way was related to
the provision for alimony.
At the time of the divorce the defendant was qualified
as a publ;c school teacher and was able to earn $150.00 per
month.

This fact was found to be true by the Findings of

Fact of the court, as shown in paragraph VI on page 22 of
the transcript.

On the 23rd day of February, 1951, the said
5
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defendant filed a Petition for Modification of Divorce Decree
with the District Court for Millard County alleging that conditions had substantially changed since the entry of the divorce decree in that she had lost her ability to support herself and had become dependent upon the charity of others.
She further claimed that the financial condition of the plaintiff respondent had substantially improved since the entry
of the decree, and prayed, based on these facts, that the
court enter a further order for alimony for her support.
The plaintiff denied the alleged substantial change of
conditions and the matter came to trial. As a result of the
triaL the court denied the petition of the defendant appellant.
As reflected by the Memorandum of Decision and the
Findings of Fact, the trial court found that there h~d been
a substantial change in the condition of the defendant appellant's health and in the financial circumstances of the plaintiff respondent. In the case of the appellant, at the time of
her petition for modification she was partially deaf. suffering from high blood pressure and a heart ailment. all of
which prevented her from obtaining gainful employment. For
several years she had been depending upon her family and
others for her maintenance. (See paragraph VI of the Findings of Fact, at page 22 of the Tr.) The financial condition
of the plaintiff respondent. on the other hand, had improved
from the sum of $1.037.50, which, at the time of the divorce
renresented one-half of the property of the parties, to the sum
of $37,857 in home, farm lands, and water stock. with an
apartment building having an additional value of $6,000.00,
and his yearly income had increased from $2,250.00 per
year to $5,250.00 per year, not including rentals receivert
from the apartment building.
6
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Although the trial court found a substantial change in the
condition of the parties as described above. the requested
award was denied.
The foregoing constitutes a brief statement of the facts
of this case.
ST/\TE1'1E~T

OF POINTS RELIED ON IN
THIS APPEAL

The defendant appellant represents to the court and
urges a reversal of the decision of the lower court upon the
following grounds:
POINT NO. I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE ORIGINAL DECREE FINALLY ADJUDICATED THE RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT TO ALJMONY. THE EXPREJSS LANGUAGE OF THE DECREE
RESERVED JURISDICTION FOR A SUBSE,QUENT DETERMINATION ,OF ALIMONY.
POI:\TT NO. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT WHETHER AN AWARD OF ALIMONY WOULD
SEEM JUST AND EQUITABLE TO THE· PRESENT DEPENDENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WAS A. LffiGAL
GROUND TO BE CONSIDERED IN MAKING AN
AvVARD.
POINT NO. III. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT
SHOW THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PLAINTIFF AND
THE DEFENDANT HAD TAKEN PLACE JUSTIFYING
AN AWARD OF ALIMONY AS PRAYED, AND THE
DECISION OF THE COURT THAT THE EVIDENCE
DID NOT JUSTIFY AN ORDER FOR ALIMONY WAS
CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND TO
THE COURT'S OWN FINDINGS.

7
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ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1. T:HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE ORIGINAL DECREE FINALLY ADJUDICATED THE RIGHT Of THE DEFENDANT TO ALIMONY. THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE DECREE
RESERVED JURISDICTION FOR A SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATION OF ALIMONY.

The plaintiff respondent in this case has not raised any
question with respect to the right of the defendant to receive
an award of alimony as granted under the original decree. In
view of this fact, pursuant to the law wb· h obtains in this
jurisdiction as set down by Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 P.
781, and Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P. 2d
428. the award of alimony made in the original decree in
this case must be presumed as having been granted upon
such evidence as justified the award. The right to alimony
of the defendant appellant was not forfeited by such conduct
as may have entitled her husband to a divorce.
Inasmuch as the original award of alimoqy, therefore,
must be presumed to have been based upon conditions meriting the same, notwithstanding any misconduct on her part.
the award of alimony would be subject to the same rules with
respect to a modification of the divorce decree in that regard
as if she were the prevailing party. This represents a modification of the old rule that permanent alimony would not be
awarded a wife where the husband obtains a divorce based
upon her dereliction. But this general rule was productive of so
much hardship, and in so many instances left the wife a prey
to shame, that i~ circumstances which justified it an award of
alimony was granted.

Undoutedly the wisdom of this public

policy was given great weight vvhen the problem of awarding
the wife alimony under such circumstances first arose in Utah

8
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'rlr

i

I

in the Doe v. Doe, supra. case. Further affirmation of this
policy is found in the recent case of Alldridge v. Alldrige,
:229 P. 2 681, __________ Utah __________ , Supreme Court of Utah,
No. 7525. April 10, 1951. wh~re the husband was granted
a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty resulting in great
mental distress. It was shown that the parties had lived together quite some time, that both parties had contributed subsantially to the marriage, and that there was evidence of her
poor health. Con~equently, an award of permanent alimony
was directed by the Supreme Court, though refused by the
:)i•
trial court.
In the instan· ;ase the trial court, by its Memorandum of
Decision and its finding in paragraph VII of the Findings of
Fact at page :23 of the transcript. ruled that the original award
of alimony was a final adjudication of the plaintiff's right to
alimony, a{ ,d that it therefore did not have power to make
a subsequ~ht award of alimony. In this respect the court'~
attention is directed to the Findings of Fact. Conclusions of
Law and Det:ree made at the time of the granting of the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce. (See pages 2, 4, and 5 of the
Tr.) The Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Decree
all deal separately with the problem of a division of the community property which should be made between the parties.
The order awarding to each of the parties a one-half interest in
their community property and ordering the plaintiff respondent to pay to the defendant appeilant one-half of the value of
said community property in accordance with said order are
dearly separate and apart from the subsequent finding, conrlusion of law and order of the court with respect· to the payment of alimony.
In the face of the clarity of the findings, conclusions of
lmv and decree it could not reasonably be argued that the

9
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court intended the award of alimony to be part and parcel of
the division of property. It is evident that two things were
accomplished with respect to the property problems of the
parties: ( 1 ) The property of the parties was given a total .
value and divided equally between them. Included was a
further order requiring the plaintiff respondent to repay the
defendant appellant for money loaned to hrm, and ( 2) the
plaintiff respondent was ordered to pay defendant alimony,
payable in monthly installments. In this connection no words
of finality were used whatsoever. The award was not made
"in lieu of all alimony" nor was language in any way synonymous with such phraseology used. Rather, in paragraph 10
of the Findings of Fact, as recited above in the Stat~ment of
Facts, the court found that the defendant appellant was
entitled to alimony in certain monthly installments covering a
certain period of time "until the further order of this court."
In the Conclusions of Law, in this connection, the court
used the same phraseology. In the Decree the court, in a
separate paragraph dealing solely with alimony, ordered that
the monthly installments of alimony be paid for the period
specified ''unless the court otherwise order and direct.'' The
language so employed does not partake in any way of the
terminology of finality which would have to be found in order
to substantiate the trial court's holding that the award of alimony was a final adjudication of the plaintiff's right to alimony. To hold that the award was a final adjudication in the
face of the language employed would do obvious violence to
the ordinarily accepted meaning of the words. Rather than
being synonymous with finality the language employed would
seem to indicate the intention of the court to reserve jurisdiction to make such further order as the circumstances might
justify. The interpretation for which the appellant ·herein
contends has been confirmed in the case of Swallow v. Swal10
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low,

92 Atl. 872, 84 N. /. Equity 109, where the phrase
"further order of the court" was interpreted to mean that the
order of the court made at that time should obtain until a
superceding order in connection with the same subject matter
should be made. Further support for such an interpretation
may be found in the following cases where, though the question of alimony was not involved, the phrases "until the further order of the court," "until ortherwise ordered by the
court," "unless otherwise directed by the court," etc. were
the subject of interpretation: Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 52

N.E. 2nd 27, 315 fvlass. 176; Ex Parte Glines, 94 P.
668. 20 Okla. 446; Curtis v. Bachman, 110 Calif. 433,
42 P. 91 0; Hokum v. Chic. R. 1. & P. Railway Co., 112 P.
1023, 27 Okla. 667; People v. Priest, 73 N.E. 1100,
181 N.Y. 300; Federal Signs System v. Amavet, 7 La. App.
680.

Further light on the question of whether or not the language used by the court in granting alimony in the present instance may be interpreted as a final adjudication of the rigltt
of alimony or as an award of alimony subject to modification
according to changed conditions, circumstances, habits, and
conduct of the parties may be obtained from the well-known
Cody v. Cody case, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 952. Under headnotes 4 and 5 of said case, the court discusses the problem of
a Hnal or full discharge· of the obligation of alimony, and said
with respect to the same:
''Thus I think the order awarding $20 a month
for the support of the child was, on such averments
and proof, subject to modiHcation. Such an order by
its very nature is continuing. So also was the order
awarding the custody of the child continuing and subject to modification according to changed conditions,
circumstances, hab'its, and conduct of the parties. So

11
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also would be an order allowing alimony for a designated amount per month or other stated period, or until
the happening of a contingency or contingencies; but
where, upon issues in evidence, the question of alimony is set at rest, either by awarding a gross sum in
lieu of all rights in and to the husband's property, or
where, in lieu of all such rights specific property is in
fee awarded to the wife, or \vhere, upon issues and
evidence adduced no alimony whatever is awarded,
then I think such an order is final and constitutes a
full discharge, unless the order awarding no alimony is
based upon the grounds that the husband then had no
property and no means with ,.vhich to support the wife,
and physically was unable to earn support for her, and
that he thereafter acquired property or otherwise became able to support her."
Reading the above excerpt from the opinion in the Cody
v. Cody case, and applying the same to the present fact situation, it would seem evident that the award of alimony made
in the present instance was an avyard which by its very nature
is continuing. This is further borne out by the holding of the
court in Barraclough u. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196,
111 P. 2d 792. In that case the trial court found that hy
stipulation the plaintiff had "consented to accept $450 as alimony herein, payable in monthly installments of $75," and
based upon this finding. decreed that:
"Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded and the
defendant is hereby required to pay to her. the sum
of $450, as alimony herein, as follows: $75 on or before the 1st day of June, 1939, and $75 on or before
the 1st day of each and every month thereafter until
the said sum of $450 shall have been paid in full:
provided that a II amounts paict on said awnrd during
the pendency of this action shall be credited thereon."
r\ftcr the entry of the interlocutory decree the plaintiff pe12
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titioned the trial court to modify the decree as to. alimony.
This was denied by the court on the ground that the stipulation between the parties constituted a lump sum complete
and final settlement of all alimony between the parties and
that such settlement had become a final judgment as to alimony in so far as a petition to modify was concerned. The
plaintiff cited this holding as error and on appeal the Supreme Court held, under headnotes 2 and 3,
'·Therefore, the trial court erred in determining
the agreement here constituted a 'complete and final
settlement of all alimony between the parties and
that such settlement has become a final judgment as
to alimony* * *insofar as a petition to modify is concerned.' In a divorce action the trial court should make
such pro~sion for alimony as the present circumstances
of the parties warrant, and any stipulation of th~
parties in respect thereto serves only as a recommendation to the court. If the court adopts the .suggestion of
the parties it does not thereby lose the right to make
such modification or change thereafter as may be requested by either party based on some change in circumstances warranting such modification.''
Except for the fact that the provision for alimony in the
Barraclough case was based on a stipulation, the legal aspects
)f the award of alimony in the Barraclough case and in the
instant case are identical. In both instances a specified amount
of alimony was ordered paid by way of monthly installments,
extending over a specified period of time. The factual situation
in the instant case is even stronger than that in the Barraclough
case by reason of the addition of the words "unlessthecourtotherwise order and direct,'' reserving power to make a further order in the matter. In view of this decision, it seems evident that
in the -instant case the court in the original decree did not
Rnally adjudicate the right of the defendant appellant to ali13
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mony and that the language of the decree was, therefore,
not such as would prevent the court from exercising the power
granted by 40-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, to make a modification thereof. if circumstances justified the same.
POINT NO. II.

TSE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT WHETHER AN AWARD OF ALIMONY WOULD
SEEM JUST AND EQUITABLE TO THE PRESENT DEPENDENTS OF ·THE PLAINTIFF WAS A LEGAL
GROUND TO BE CONSIDERED IN MAKING AN
AWARD.

The trial court in finding number VIII at page 23 of the
transcript found that it would be ''unjust and unequitable to
the present dependents of the plaintitf" to make an order
requiring him to pay further alimony to the defendant
appellant.
Based upon the finding, the trial court. in the Conclusions of Law, concluded that it would be unjust and unfair
to the present dependents of the defendant to make such an
order. Based upon this Finding of Fact and Conclusion of
Lmv, and the others included therein, the court denied the
defendant appellant's prayer for a further ilWard of alimony.
It seems evident that whether or not an avvard of alimony
would be fair and just to the present dependents of the plainbtl' respondent is not a material issue in this case for the reason
that they are not parties to the suit. and that his obligation to
the . defendant appellant with respect to alimony arises out
of a prior obligation which he owed to her by reason of their
marriage and the provisions of their subsequent divorce decree.
Assuming that the appellant is correct in her position that
the provision of alimony in the original divorce decree was a
continuing award which was subject to modi!ication, as more
fully explained above, then respondent's obligation pursuant

14
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to said decree would precede any subsequent obligation which
he might undertake or contract. Numerous annotations at 30
A.L.R. 79, 64 A.L.R. 1269, and 112 A.L.R. 246 all bear
out the fact that remarriage and contraction of new obligations
and responsibilities thereby. subsequent to the time when a
decree of the court was entered requiring the payment of
alimony. does not constitute a fact to be considered in determining whether or not a change of circumstances has taken
place sufficient to justify a modification of the decree of
divorce.
Furthermore. the finding of the court concerning plaintiff's rather substantial financial picture. cannot justify the
court's conclusion that his financial condition and earning
ability are insufficient to make an award.
POINT NO. III.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT

SHOW THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PLAINTIFF AND
THE DEFENDANT HAD TAKEN PLACE JUSTIFYING
AN AWARD OF ALIMONY AS PRAYED, AND THE
DECISION OF THE COURT THAT THE EVIDENCE
DID NOT JUSTIFY AN ORDER FOR AI.JIMONY WAS
CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND TO
THE COURT''S OWN FINDINGS.

The old rule which obtained independent of statute. that.
permanent alimony will not be awarded a wife where the
husband obtains a divorce on grounds of her fault or marital
misconduct. was modified because it was productive of so
much hardship and so frequently left the wife a "prey to
starvation and shame." (Am. /uris., Vol. 17, page 478.) In
the present case the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
show ample justification for the application of the modified

rule.
15
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In paragraph VI of the Findings of Fact, at page 22 of
the T r.. the court finds as follows:
"That the defendant, at the time of' the divorce.
was qualified as a public schoolteacher, and was able
to earn $150.00 per month. That she is now partially
deaf and has high blood pressure and a heart ailment,
· all of which prevent her from obtaining gainful employment, and that for several years she has been
dependent upon brothers and sisters and other relatives for her maintenance. That the defendant has
no property, except. an interest as an heir of her
father in a home, which interest is of a value not exceeding $500.00."
Most certainly the above finding must be acknowledged as
meaning that a very substantial change in her material circumstances has taken place, thnt she is suffering a great deal
of hardship and that she has well-nigh been left "a prey to
starvation and shame."
On the other hand. the financial circumstances of the
plaintiff respondent have materially improved. His present
holding of property totals approximately $40,000, exclusive
of the interest of his present wife in the apartment house.
This represents an increase of more than fifteen times in the
value of his holdings from the time of the original divorce. His
salary per year, not including apartment rentals. has more than
doubled. increasing from $2,250 per year to $5.250 per year.
In view of the apparent material change in the circumstances of the appellant and the respondent, as reflected in
the findings of the trial court, it is evident that there is not
only a need for assistance in her behalf but that there is more
than sufficient legal justification for the court to exercise the
power \tvhich it has under 40-3-5, Utah Code Annotated.
1943, and grant to th~ defendant appellant an award of
alimony.

1.6
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CONCLUSION
The defendant submits that the court committed error in
refusing her petition for modification of the decree of divorce
upon the grounds that the original Decree was a final adjudication of the defendant appellant's right to alimony and that
a further award of alimony would not only be unjust and inequitable but was not justified under the circumstances. It is,
therefore, submitted that the case should be reversed with
directions to the trial court to grant the petition of the defendant for further award of alimony.

Respectfully submitted,,

KING & ANDERSON.
Attorneys /or Defendant and Appellant.

17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

